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Abstract
Data harvesting and profiling have become a de facto business model for many 
businesses in the digital economy.  The surveillance of individual persons through their use of 
private sector platforms has a well-understood effect on personal autonomy and democratic 
institutions.  In this article, we explore the consequences of implementing data-rich services in 
the public sector and specifically the dangers inherent to undermining the universality of the 
reach of public services, the implicit endorsement of the platform operators by government, 
and the inability of members of the public to avoid using the platforms in practice.  We 
propose a set of good practices in the form of design principles that infrastructure services can 
adopt to mitigate the risks, and we specify a set of design primitives that can be used to 
support the development of infrastructure that follows the principles.  We argue that providers 
of public infrastructure should adopt a practice of critical assessment of the consequences of 
their technology choices.
Introduction
Services mediated by ICT platforms, including car sharing, hotel booking, social 
media, and more, have shaped the landscape of the digital markets and catalyzed immense 
economic opportunities.  Unfortunately, the growth of platform-mediated services comes with 
a cost. One of the most serious challenges is the pervasive surveillance of individual 
interactions with the services that leads to accumulation and centralization of “Big Data”: 
linked transactions and attributes related to individual persons.  The users of platforms not 
only surrender the value of their digital traces (i.e. their privacy is compromised) but also 
subject themselves to the power and control that data brokers exert for prediction and 
manipulation (Zuboff 2015). 
As the platform revolution takes hold in the area of public services, it is important to 
first safeguard such services from the pitfalls that have already been identified in the 
application of platform services to other areas.  Just as importantly, public services have a 
responsibility to ensure that their technology is accessible, suitable, and appropriate for 
everyone.  In pursuit of innovation, many policymakers embrace technologies without proper 
consideration of all the costs and risks. Misuse of Big Data collected via the administration of 
public services might be harmful not only because the data might be particularly sensitive and 
detailed but also because the users might not have a legitimate choice about whether to share 
their data.
In this paper we explore beyond the deleterious consequences of surveillance for the 
privacy of citizens: we identify the crucial, potentially devastating ways in which data from 
surveillance can be used to bypass democratic processes. Rather than choosing a single 
definition of a democratic regime, we follow Diamond and Morolino (2004) and focus on 
certain dimensions of political processes, such as trade-offs involving representation and 
accountability, within a society and analyze how data-rich services can alter the position of a 
polity on these dimensions. 
Additionally, we propose a set of design principles for data systems in public services, 
which can serve as a guideline or benchmark in the assessment and deployment of platform-
mediated services.
Finally, we propose a set of generic and generative design primitives that can be used 
to fulfil the proposed constraints and exemplify best practices in the deployment of platforms 
that deliver services in the public interest. We suggest that policymakers could adopt these 
design primitives and best practices as standards by which the appropriateness of candidate 
technology platforms can be assessed in the evaluation of their suitability for delivering public 
services.
Platform revolution and democracy
The last decade has seen a revolution in the digital market. The terms “sharing 
economy” (Hamari, Sjöklint, and Ukkonen 2016; Sundararajan 2016), “platform economy” 
(Kenney and Zysman 2016), and “platform revolution” (Choudary, Van Alstyne, and Parker 
2016) all describe similar models that rely on so-called collaborative consumption (Belk 
2014; Botsman and Rogers 2010). However, the true key to the success of platform-based 
services is collection, aggregation, and analysis of data that allow their proprietors to sell 
advertisements or fitting products to customers. This platform surveillance constitutes a new 
economic form that defines the dominant practices of online service providers (Wood and 
Monahan 2019).
The data gathered through such “dataveillance” (Clarke 1988) and the resulting 
profiling of users can be abused not only for the financial profit of platform owners at the 
expense of their customers (Zuboff 2015) but also by other actors to target persuasive social 
and political messages. Much public debate has been devoted to the possibility of the harm 
such practices deal to democratic processes (Badawy, Ferrara, and Lerman 2018; Allcott and 
Gentzkow 2017; Aral and Eckles 2019; Helbing et al. 2019). Democracy in this understanding 
(Diamond 2019) relies on the informed, fact-reliant choices of citizens that are not 
predominantly driven by emotional response or herding behavior, both of which can be 
induced by tailored messages. 
Because the term “democracy” is applied to increasingly differing political systems 
(Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg 2017), it may be tempting to overlook the impact of 
such abuses of data accumulation and treat them as a new form of political or social 
campaigning. It rests in the hands of national and international law makers to decide to what 
extent this behavior should be limited and to take appropriate action. We argue here that if 
similar platform and app-based, data-rich services would be implemented in the public sector 
without appropriate, a priori regulation, for example to furnish smart city lighting, voting, or 
personalized assistance in any public service, the problem could be exacerbated. This is even 
more problematic when the provision of the services is outsourced to specific actors in the 
private sector, creating a state-corporate nexus (Hayes 2012) with tightly-coupled 
responsibilities and accountability. The private sector can abuse data by bypassing laws or 
taking advantage of loopholes and inadequate law (“Cookiebot Report: Hidden Tracking of 
Citizens on EU Government and Health Sector Websites” 2019). However, if governmental 
agencies abuse collected data, then such abuse could become a legitimized practice, leaving 
little to no avenue for appeal. 
The scope of democratic liberties and procedures varies greatly among nation states, 
and it is not our goal to analyze what difference data gathering and misuse could make in each 
case. Instead we would like to highlight how the systematic aggregation of data, centralization 
of data, and “nudging” within personalized services can progressively shift the balance 
between values that are recognized as inherent to democratic political systems, such as 
freedom, equality, and control (Bühlmann et al. 2012; Bochsler and Kriesi 2013). Values are 
characteristics towards which individuals and groups strive, some of which are by definition  
contradictory, creating moral dilemmas that need to be resolved (Schwartz 2012). 
The defining principle of democracy is that power is assigned to a broad set of 
decision-makers (e.g. Knutsen 2010; Campbell 2008). While many different implementations 
of this principle can be traced through history and among current democratic states, varying in 
the degree and form of devolution, the common point is that democratic polities recognize the 
ideological and pragmatic value of pluralism, such as better representation of local conditions, 
better adoption of policies or greater adaptability (Manor 1999; Ribot 2007). Diversity is 
recognized as conducive to better solutions and adaptation in various sciences, including 
political science (Ober 2008), social science (Cioffi-Revilla 2005), complexity (Simon 1962), 
systems science (Page 2008), and many others.
The advantages to increasing pluralism among voices that decide on the course of a 
social system, such as a nation state or an institution, are counterbalanced by the effectiveness 
of the decision-making process. Achieving a working consensus is easier when there are 
fewer voices to reconcile (Arrow 1951). In the extreme case decision making is the easiest 
when there is a single voice. This is due not only to the fact that combining inputs is harder 
when there are more of them, but also to the fact that including more voices means accepting 
that more of them will not be well-informed or good-willed.
We can thus think of representative democracy as a way to optimize between the 
advantages of pluralism and the effectiveness of singular decision makers (Dahl 1994). 
Effective representation requires that those chosen to represent are accountable to those that 
have chosen them (Diamond and Morlino 2004). To ensure such accountability, the power to 
“control” is given both to the governing as well as the governed (Bühlmann et al. 2012). Such 
mutual accountability might sacrifice some short-term effectiveness for long-term stability; 
for example, in communities governing pooled resources, accountability is one of the 
principles that protect them from depletion (Ostrom 1990).
Another value that is typical in modern democracy but stems from the Athenian model 
of democracy, is privacy, specifically in the sense that no citizen has a right to interfere with 
the doings of others (Goldschmidt 1954). Privacy may be considered crucial to maintain 
independence of voices. When voices become uniform, the advantages of pluralism disappear 
(Page 2008). Similarly to the case of pluralism, increasing privacy carries costs. In particular, 
some measure of scrutiny might be necessary for collective security.  This balance relies on 
mutual accountability among decision-makers, which in turn requires strong laws or norms to 
prevent the most powerful from avoiding their obligations to the rest.
In this paper we aim to analyze how the implementation of particular, implicit 
practices related to data, many of which are already entrenched in the private-sector services, 
can affect the balance between democratic values. We also present design principles that can 
be used to consciously choose and establish the point of balance. We posit that awareness of 
the trade-offs of data based services should be a requirement in policy decisions. 
Platform revolution in the public sector
Massive data gathering
If digital platforms were implemented in the public sector to provide public services 
via platforms and apps, then the Big Data gathered from user behavior and from various 
device sensors could provide the basis for revolutionizing the public sector. Services would be 
better fitted, policy-making could become more data-driven and evidence-based, and the costs 
would be reduced for both the administration of the public sector as well as for citizens, 
embodying Giddens’ vision of welfare surveillance wherein social supervision translates into 
better public services (Weller 2012). This would comply with a widely shared sentiment that 
while Big Data advantages have boosted the private sector, similar advantages have yet to be 
realized in the public sector (González Bailón 2013; Kim, Trimi, and Chung 2014)‐ . However, 
extensive data gathering and analysis in the public sector can lead to the same dangers of 
manipulating public opinions and behavior as have been identified in the private sector 
(Helbing 2016), even more so as many public services rely specifically on sensitive data. 
So far, reservations about Big Data and related “dataveillance” (Clarke 1988) in the 
public sector were usually focused on security issues (Mergel, Rethemeyer, and Isett 2016) 
and privacy (Desouza and Jacob 2017). It is worth noting that commitment to securing the 
data once gathered is tantamount to a belief that both current and future data custodians will 
not be willing to abuse their access (Aste and Goodell 2018). A working data protection 
system does not address the potential harm that could result from its misuse (i.e. data security 
itself does not imply privacy).
 We argue that the consequences transcend breach of privacy or commitment to 
security and involve the fundamental mechanisms built into democratic societies, such as 
decentralization and accountability that maintain balances between the values of efficiency 
and pluralism, and between the values of freedom and control.
The first reason for inducing such imbalances is the fact that the act of observing 
citizens through the lens of various, ubiquitous sensors and metrics from apps and devices can 
change the behavior of the observed (Landsberger 1958), both through incentives as well as 
through chilling effects (Schauer 1978). An example comes from the People’s Republic of 
China whose government started testing the usefulness of a social credit system for 
“increasing social trust” by incentivizing behaviors the government deems trustworthy 
(“Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)” 2014). At 
first look, the motivation for this system might seem to be to build a Foucaultian panopticon, 
wherein citizens, aware of being observed, self-govern and change their behavior (Elmer 
2012). However, any data gathering that is used to incentivize certain behaviors also leads to 
classification: surveillance as sorting (Gandy Jr 2012). 
Even for benevolent governments, an existential goal is to stay in power, and 
statistical “boxing” can be employed as a bureaucratic tool of control (Bowker and Star 2000) 
to reduce accountability. In democratic societies the principle of equality (Diamond and 
Morlino 2004) requires that public services should be available and accessible to all citizens 
in a non-discriminatory manner. Any classification can simplify exclusion, upsetting the 
balance between the equality and control dimensions of effective democracy (Bühlmann et al. 
2012). For example, data gathering itself, as a result of its dependence upon technology 
adoption and deployment, can be biased to exclude some groups, for instance elderly citizens 
due to low technology use and fluency, or citizens of poorer regions due to low public 
investment in technology in these places (Desouza and Jacob 2017; Mergel, Rethemeyer, and 
Isett 2016; Reuters 2014). In effect, the services themselves will evolve to suit selected 
segments of the population, whilst for other segments, the access to services, as well as the 
control over how these services are implemented and assessed, will be limited.
Moreover, such statistical surveillance disproportionately affects populations that are 
already at a disadvantage. Just as data surveillance in commercial platforms causes 
cumulative disadvantages for the poorer members of society (Gandy Jr 2012), public services 
targeted at marginalized populations often purportedly require increased surveillance 
(Monahan 2017). What is especially alarming is that the nature of statistical surveillance as 
remote, distant (Gandy Jr 2012), and mechanistic, contributes to dehumanizing narratives 
about the marginalized populations (Monahan 2017). This happens even in situations in which 
the purported motivation of introducing such citizen observation is to improve their welfare.
When the assumption of benevolence on the part of platform and service providers is 
violated, segmentation of citizens can be used to specifically inconvenience certain groups, 
favor certain others or simply ignore minorities once they are identified. Such actions might 
mistakenly attributed to the specific design of the technology: Excuses such as “technological 
inevitability” are commonly used to cover deliberate negligence (Zuboff 2019). Similarly, the 
term “platform”, when used to describe a service, connotes neutrality and obscures the agency 
of the technology supplier (Plantin et al. 2018) in the pursuit of its own interests (Langlois 
and Elmer 2013), irrespective of whether it is a public agency or a contractor from the private 
sector that provides the service.
Classification enabled by amassing data and incentivizing behaviors within services 
can thus shift the balance between the effectiveness of services and the accountability of the 
public agencies providing the service. Yet another danger might lie in the aspects of this 
system that diverge from a panopticon scenario: by being unobtrusive and obscure in its goals 
and motivations, it can even more surely and imperceptibly alter citizen behavior in the 
process of behavioral nudging. 
Data aggregation and behavioral nudging
While IT surveillance leads to massive data gathering, this by itself, and even 
combined with easily unpacked incentives for certain behaviors, is a starting point for much 
more complex applications when it is used as a source for prediction and covert (rather than 
based on clear incentives) modification of behaviors. Just as data are used in commercial 
platforms, data gathered on individual users (“citizen-consumers”) can feed algorithms that 
can both predict the behavior of individuals as well as control such behavior through 
appropriately chosen and placed cues. Behavioral “nudging” (Sunstein and Thaler 2003; 
Sunstein 2014) can be more successful than direct “pushing” (i.e. incentives) for the reason 
that because its mechanics are opaque and difficult to understand, it cannot be easily opposed 
(Helbing et al. 2019). 
The aim of nudging is to change citizen behavior for the greater good, i.e. into pro-
social behavior as defined by the policy-makers, through small cues embedded in the 
environment of the public space (Shafir 2013; Olejniczak and Śliwowski 2015). An example 
is the placement of speed bumps on roads in residential areas or of roundabouts in dangerous 
spots on roads with higher speed limits to force drivers to slow down. 
Historically, environmental affordances have been used to push questionable policies. 
For example, certain black and white neighborhoods in the U.S. were separated with 
highways to limit the possibility of contact by increasing the required effort (Lessig 2000). 
Architectural constraints are effective for such subversive goals, as they are often perceived 
by citizens as an inevitability rather than a planned choice and are thus overlooked. 
If data from many services and many citizen actions are aggregated and linked via Big 
Data analytics into detailed user profiles, the cues can be tailored to the characteristics of 
particular individuals on the basis of their vulnerabilities, thus reducing the chance for 
informed choice (Zuboff 2019). Pervasive surveillance of citizens can thus be more than a 
mere breach of privacy, it can also undermine the agency of citizens through imperceptible 
control of their behavior. In effect, both the balance between privacy and control as well as 
the balance between effectiveness and accountability may shift. 
Although unlimited data amassing by itself can upset the balance, even greater dangers 
come from linking the various records in the databases, either directly, such as to each other 
or to the identity of the data subject, or indirectly, for example by the time, location, or type of 
an activity. For individuals, the  power to unilaterally link together different attributes or 
transactions associated with an individual person threatens the right to privacy. If multiple 
requests for the service (e.g. wherein persons board public transportation vehicles) can be 
linked to each other (e.g. the same passenger card was used), then the person can be profiled, 
and his or her linked activities can provide additional information (e.g. the person’s 
occupation or employer) even when other identifying information is not known (O’Hara 
2011). Further examples of inferences might include determining an individual’s home 
address by identifying travel starting points, identifying habits and social class from 
destinations in shopping and dining areas, and so on. Such aggregation and linkage of data 
points (while possibly making the service more effective) infringes on the privacy of citizens 
– privacy requires not only protecting precise identification in the form of a name or an ID, 
but ensuring that the complex, intertwined characteristics, behaviors, and associations of a 
given person remain within that person’s control. 
On the system level, the detailed profiles of citizens, irrespective of whether they are 
linked by an ID or by some other feature, such as device MAC address, debit or credit card 
number, and so on, create profound vulnerabilities that can be abused to compromise 
democratic processes. From the launching of targeted campaigns, to systematic neglect of 
specific citizen groups, to suppression of the rights of political opponents, to manipulation of 
needs and opinions, the linkage of data and profiling of citizens may become a powerful tool 
of control (Helbing et al. 2019). 
Taken together, data gathering and behavioral nudging based on data can destabilize 
certain self-regulatory mechanisms inherent to democratic regimes. Massive data gathering on 
a vast fraction of citizens can change the behavior of the observed especially if it allows 
segmentation of the population and the development of different incentives for different 
groups. Such a process can undermine the pluralism of opinions and behaviors in the 
population. Algorithms operating on the data can add to this the ability to personalize the cues 
and triggers for certain behaviors with unprecedented accuracy while remaining unseen, 
hiding this process from public oversight, undermining accountability of the representatives, 
and possibly limiting sustainability (e.g. of public resources). These two characteristics may 
enable governmental institutions to detach themselves from their constituents by defining 
norms for behavior and shaping the behavior of individual persons without any accountability.
Data centralization
One of the principles of democracy is the assignment of decision-making power to the 
citizens. In representative democracy this principle is implemented by decentralization of 
governance, i.e. a process of decision making that underscores the variability in local 
circumstances, situation, needs and values (Manor 1999). 
The main risk in a free flow of data between government authorities and public 
services within and across departments and institutions lies in the fact that data shared in this 
way contributes to building a centralized data cache. While the opportunities from having 
such a cache are often described (Desouza and Jacob 2017), we argue that this process upsets 
the balances between the control of the government and control of the constituents. The 
surveillance of citizens through IT solutions involves extracting value from behavior (Plantin 
and Punathambekar 2019) and centralization of data caches moves this value away from local 
representatives. In this manner, the centralized database moves power from local, 
decentralized departments to centralized decision making. 
Moreover, centralization of data from different sources can enable linking of records 
on individual persons, even if they do not poses the same unique identifiers.  Specifically, the 
overlap of specific traits and characteristics is enough to aggregate data (O’Hara 2011).
In contrast, local databases, organized in an application-specific way, with unlinked 
user data, may provide local authorities with social capital to improve the local conditions by 
developing fitting solutions with public funds at their disposal. Such public services as 
transportation, public space, cultural artifacts and collections thereof (such as museums or 
galleries) can be enhanced by improving their functioning, accessibility or display based on 
locally gathered data. 
 In this way, the knowledge that local institutions can bring to the table when 
negotiating with their peers or with the central government is unique and constitutes social 
capital, a resource that grows and evolves in a path dependent way, inseparable from local 
history and values, and which cannot be reduced to a certain number of bits of data. 
Transferring data to a central cache detracts from the usefulness of this capital, as the role of 
such knowledge in policy making on national level will be diminished.
A centralized cache may create an impression that local governance and local 
institutions are no longer needed to represent local needs, as their needs are believed to be 
represented in the data. With data centralized, the stakeholder set is reduced to whoever 
manages the database (presumably central government) and individual citizens tasked with 
securing their needs, leading to a significant concentration of  power. Individuals are forced to 
interact with actors who are not interested in their particular needs (rather, of the society as a 
whole) and whom they have little power to influence (Dahl 1994). This shifts the balance 
between the power to control of the governed and of the governing (Bühlmann et al. 2012), 
limiting the former’s ability to hold public institutions accountable. 
The problem of data centralization is becoming more and more complex with the 
sophistication of digital services, which most often requires that public agencies need to 
outsource the implementation, maintenance and analytics to private contractors. The interplay 
of public and private sector (i.e. the state-corporate nexus, Hayes 2012) presents a daunting 
challenge to ensure that citizen rights are preserved.  For example, companies providing US 
police with IT solutions (e.g. cameras and recording devices and tools to analyze the data) try 
to optimize their financial interests by improving their products and services for their 
immediate customer, the police departments (Gates 2019), potentially leading to 
simplification of procedures or sharing of sensitive data that are convenient for police officers 
but bypass citizen rights.
This is even more problematic with the current drive to offer software as a service 
rather than a product. In this model, the front end of applications serves only as an interface 
for users whilst most of the functions – including data storage and analytics – are performed 
in the cloud, on the servers and databases of the service provider. This further complicates the 
processes of accountability of governmental and state agencies that aim to deliver the service 
but subcontract its provision to private sector. Each use of such service will create many 
copies of data, as the mere act of transfer between clients and servers will create copies. This 
is not only a security issue, but also regulatory problem: data required for the services might 
become centralized without proper recognition by the public bodies officially providing the 
service. 
In effect, centralized databases holding citizen data reduce both the representation of 
diversity as well as the decentralization of governance, while possibly increasing speed and 
efficiency of the decision making process. 
Example: The SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic
The complexity of the balances and trade-offs in data handling in the public sector is 
perfectly exemplified by the different ways in which central governments implemented 
technologies, applications, and platforms to contain the SARS-CoV-2 virus. For example, in 
Russia, face recognition is used to enforce quarantine orders, in Poland selfie-posting is used 
for the same purpose, and in South Korea apps are used to track social contacts of citizens 
(Seerat 2020). 
In the case of pandemic, the value of privacy is juxtaposed against the value of public 
health. Massive data gathering can help trace contacts between the infected and the 
susceptible and thus not only save lives and health of those primary contacts but also prevent 
further infections and reduce the spreading of the virus. If this data are centralized, i.e. 
combined into a single database on the level of the nation state or federation of states, they 
may enable the modelling and prediction of the epidemic spread. If data are combined across 
many sources (such as data from other apps that have information about medications, sports 
activities, general lifestyle, or potential medical treatment) this aggregate dataset can even be 
used to inform studies on the virus and disease itself, which could serendipitously help find a 
cure or a vaccine. 
However, such serendipity comes at a high price, as pervasive long-term tracking of 
the mobility of individuals is an invasion of privacy. This can be further exacerbated if also 
other data are collected, such as social relations, health related behaviors or medical history. 
Not only privacy is compromised: such sensitive data can be used to construct detailed 
distributions of health behaviors and health condition of citizens, for example to classify them 
into risk categories, allowing insurance firms to capture consumer surplus. Furthermore, the 
more data and the more detailed they are, the easier it would be to statistically draw 
conclusions about illnesses, habits, previous medical treatments, family status, and 
employment status beyond the specific fields in the database. Further, when amassed and 
aggregated this data could provide a vast trove of information for targeting political 
campaigning, addressing in a personalized way the ailments of each individual. If the curators 
of such database were benevolent, this might simply boost their political position. However, if 
this assumption were violated, then such analytics could be used to exclude or discriminate 
against the vulnerable, limiting costs by preferentially providing health care to those in better 
condition, or to discriminate those who request politically sensitive medical treatments that 
are ideologically opposed by the curator of the data or otherwise stigmatized (e.g. abortion, in 
vitro procedures, repeated addiction therapy, etc.). Moreover, if the database were accessed 
without permission, its contents could be exploited and misused by various organizations, 
such as insurance companies, credit score assessors, employers, etc.
The construction of a centralized, linked database to address emergencies related to the 
pandemic could bring not only a multitude of advantages but a multitude of risks as well. If 
the choice is set in this way, it might be a difficult decision. It should not be the case that the 
price for health security is paid in democratic or human rights. Certain limitations on citizens’ 
privacy and freedom are needed in times of an emergency, but as the EU Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Dunja Mijatovic stated, these can be employed “only under exceptional and 
precise conditions while offering adequate legal safeguards and independent supervision” 
(Mijatovic 2020). The conditions she lists, including but not limited to anonymity, encryption, 
non-discriminatory design, and transparency, are analogous to the checks and balances that 
are characteristic of democratic systems and required for accountability (Diamond and 
Morlino 2004). 
Fulfilling these requirements can be greatly simplified by thoughtful design of the 
services. Indeed, many of the advantages of a centralized database described above can be 
obtained if the services for tracking infections are constructed in a different way, preserving 
some general design principles. In the case of disease tracking these would include 
decentralization of data storage (e.g. on the users device instead of cloud), opening of the 
source code for transparency, limitation of data gathering (e.g. only a time sorted list of 
anonymous, single use identifiers for physical space contacts, rather than the precise locations 
of users or personally identifying information about their contacts), the prevention by design 
of data linkage between different apps and different uses of the same app (e.g. lack of 
connection of the app to hardware operators or their default apps, single use identifiers for 
contacts that cannot be cross-identified when gathering data from users within the same 
location) and similar. In the next section we describe these principles in more detail and 
generalize them for other possible services.
Design principles for data management in the 
public sector
The transfer of public services from offline into the digital by implementing them in 
mobile applications and web-based platforms can improve the participation of citizens and 
increase convenience. The digitization of public services is already in motion and can only be 
presumed to increase in speed and scope. However, this process can upset the balances 
between various dimensions of democratic procedures and as such should be carefully 
monitored. It is not enough to simply state that public services should not contribute to the 
surveillance of citizens, as any digital service will inevitably produce data. Rather, 
researchers, engineers and policy practitioners should focus on establishing good practices to 
guide the process of digitization of public services. 
Principle 1. Minimizing data collection
Public services delivered via applications and platforms and in principle all services 
that digitize data on their users, should strive to collect only the minimal amount of data 
required to supply the service.  Note that this approach is fundamentally different from “data 
protection”, which assumes that a broad set of data will be collected by service providers and 
the effectiveness of which relies upon their policy adhesion, compliance procedures, and 
enforcement.
The principle of minimizing data collection has additional caveats. First, the decision 
on what data is truly needed should not be determined by the service providers themselves, 
especially not on the basis of “technological inevitability”. We argue that neither the 
technology itself not its low cost justify data gathering. There is a push to innovate in the 
public sector, but innovation or implementation of innovative technologies should not be a 
goal in itself. Rather, technology should be a means to achieve goals set by or negotiated with 
the constituents. 
Principle 2. Data decentralization
Data decentralization ensures that privacy rights integral to democratic polities can be 
recognized and balanced properly. The fact that digitalized data on citizens can be shared in a 
costless manner does not justify breaking such balances. Nor does “technological 
inevitability” associated with automatic synchronization of data, automatic transfers, or 
backups that involve services or entities beyond the original supplier of service justify 
upsetting the balance. We argue that exactly because the transfers are so easy and do not incur 
costs they should be policed even more vigilantly.  
While in certain circumstances some degree of data centralization might be necessary, 
this process should be carefully regulated and subject to oversight by appropriate public 
institutions. For example, metadata from contact tracing in the case of an epidemic, as 
described earlier, might require some centralization. Similarly, intelligence operations might 
benefit from centralized databases. However, all such cases require oversight from dedicated 
public bodies: much abuse results from insufficent checks and balances on such procedures of 
data accumulation (Snowden 2019).
We argue that public institutions should be held to the same or higher standards as 
private ones when it comes to passing data to third parties, including not only private-sector 
contractors but also public institutions and governmental agencies beyond the specific one 
that the citizen is sharing data with within a particular service. In all cases, the collection of 
data that might be of interest to third parties should require explicit user consent, both for its 
collection in the first instance and for its distribution to specific third parties. 
Whenever the creation of a technology behind a service or the provision of the whole 
service is outsourced to private companies or non-governmental organizations, these entities 
should be held to the same principles. Specifically, they should be required to operate within 
the regulatory perimeter and to be subject to public oversight just as public institutions are. 
This includes transparency in the information that is collected and how it is used, justification 
for the necessity of data collection and requirement of explicit consent when collecting and 
sharing data. Moreover, citizens should not be forced into non-consensual relationships with 
third party operators. At minimum, when provision of the service is impossible without 
outsourcing to private agents, the citizens’ freedom of choice of private-sector providers 
should be protected. A selection of providers should be available so that the users are able to 
assess their trustworthiness and to develop trust relations at will. 
We posit that public sector institutions should be responsible for the whole process of 
data gathering, analysis and use in the service: they should be able to track, control and take 
responsibility for every part of the process, even when parts of it are subcontracted to private 
actors. This can be done e.g. through dictating unitary  terms of service that would oblige the 
direct service provider, as well as any third parties involved to follow good practices in data 
management. Moreover, citizens should be able to easily appeal any mishandling of data, with 
clear points of contact and accountability. Vigilance and expertise is required to regulate and 
monitor digital public services so that the private sector does not abuse its position as the 
supplier of services.
Principle 3. Keeping data linkages a citizen prerogative
We argue that the practice of allowing users to control the linkages among their data 
records should be part of the design in all public services provided digitally. This means that 
more responsibility would lie on the individual, which in turn would require public service 
providers to organize proper education and informational campaigns. Citizens should be 
aware not only of the risks of unlimited data linking but also of their rights to remain private, 
and their responsibility in keeping the data secure.
Commitment to protect one’s data might seem like a high expectation of an average 
citizen. Indeed, ensuring that a large percentage of individuals can keep their data secure 
would require an effort both on the part of citizens as well as central and local governments 
and non-governmental organizations. First, any data-rich public services should be deployed 
following best practices, such as the design principles presented here. Moreover, the user 
interfaces should be designed with care, so that non-critical data are not collected by default. 
It is also crucial that citizens understand that data collection of this sort can endanger the 
democratic processes, by manipulation of opinions, reduction of pluralism and evasion of 
accountability. Protection of privacy can be construed as a public good problem: while some 
individuals might not care for their own privacy and might be willing to share their data 
freely, a critical mass of citizens protecting their data is necessary to mitigate the risks of data 
accumulation described earlier. Thus protection of one’s data can be viewed as one of the 
civic responsibilities of citizens of democratic states.
Techniques
We identify five specific techniques that can be used as design primitives for the 
establishment (and, in many cases, refactoring) of technology infrastructure for public 
services.  The main objectives of these techniques are to avoid the collection and aggregation 
of personal data and to keep the linkage between data records pertaining to individual persons 
strictly in the hands of the individual persons themselves.
Technique 1. Metadata-resistant, attribute-based credentials.
The first technique we propose can serve the first principle – minimizing data 
collection – as well as the last one – allowing individuals to manage the linkages between 
their data. The idea is to minimize gathering unnecessary data attributes of service users and 
to rely on the specific attributes that are required to give access to a service. Offline 
credentials and many digitized signed credentials contain metadata such as biometrics (e.g. 
photographs), references to other credentials (name, address, etc.), or simply open-ended 
fields that can be populated with arbitrary information.  Sometimes these metadata are 
automatically transferred when a third party credential is used to authenticate an individual. 
This can happen for example, when a user logs in with a social media login to be able to 
comment on a public service website, or when social media profiles are used for public 
services. 
Metadata included in these ways are self-defeating, particularly for electronic 
credentials that are automatically associated with transaction records when they are presented, 
if our goal is to minimize data collection and prevent linkages between transactions carried 
out by the same individual.  Rather than providing issuers with a way to potentially de-
anonymize their clients, systems should instead require issuers to generate a set of signing 
keys, one for each attribute for which the issuer can make an attestation about an individual, 
and use the appropriate key to generate a bare signature without any metadata.  The particular 
attribute implied by the signature is determined from the choice of key that is used to generate 
the signature.  For example, if citizens paying their taxes in a particular region are eligible for 
reduced fees for public transportation services in that region, the only attribute that they 
should be required to present to receive the discount should be “Y is a tax payer in region X”. 
Thus, a key specific to attributes of tax paying locations should be used to sign such a 
message which can then be shown to public transportation officials to authorize the citizen to 
receive reduced fares. No additional information should be required or automatically linked. It 
may seem that the easiest way would be for the citizen to present a paper or a digital tax form 
that he or she submitted. However, this way the citizen inadvertently reveals many more 
personal attributes, such as name, residential address, income, marital status, and so forth. 
Instead, she should be able to receive a signed credential from the tax office that does not 
include any other attributes than the office where the tax form was submitted.
A significant challenge to personal privacy arises from the perception of strong non-
transferability as a desirable property of credential systems.  Digital identity systems, 
therefore, often rely upon the assumption that individuals will establish a single ‘root’ identity 
or master key that links together all of the various credentials that they would seek to attest.  
In fact, many and perhaps most public infrastructure services do not actually require strong 
non-transferability.  Consider for example access to library resources, public transportation, 
and mobile data services, each of which can be provided by governments or private-sector 
institutions alike.  Goodell and Aste have demonstrated that it is possible to design a system 
of bearer credentials that can facilitate use of such services without exposing individuals to 
the risk of profiling by exploiting provable relationships among the credentials (Goodell and 
Aste 2019).
Technique 2. Blind signatures.
A related technique that would support attribute based authorization are blind 
signatures. This solution can also help minimize data collection and automatic linkages. If the 
issuer of a credential signs a message about a client, and if the client then delivers this 
message to a relying party or to anyone else, then the issuer will be able to identify and track 
the signature when it is furnished to a relying party.   This creates a problem, particularly if 
the issuer is asked to maintain identifying records linking its clients to its signatures and to 
disclose information on demand that links the signatures to those records.  The solution is for 
the system to support blind signatures.  A blind signature scheme requires a 'blinding' function 
that (a) when applied to a message, obfuscates the contents of that message for anyone who 
does not know the inverse of the function, and (b) commutes with the cryptographic signing 
function that will be used by the signer of some message (Chaum 1983).  Then, a client can 
first apply the 'blinding' function to some message, then send the 'blinded' message to an 
issuer to be signed, and finally apply the inverse of the 'blinding' function to reveal a signature 
on the original message.  The effect is akin to (a) writing a message on a slip of paper, (b) 
inserting that slip of paper along with a slip of carbon paper into a sealed security envelope, 
(c) asking the issuer to sign the outside of the envelope and then return the envelope without 
breaking the seal, and finally (d) opening the envelope to reveal the original message with the 
signature of the issuer.
The value of this approach is that, although everyone can see that the issuer signed the 
envelope, the issuer is not able to recognize the unblended signature when it is presented.  In 
this manner, the issuer would not be able to maintain records that could subsequently de-
anonymize the client.   By obviating such an attack, the use of blind signatures aligns the 
interests of the issuer with the interests of its clients.  Furthermore, because the issuers in this 
case are less valuable as targets of powerful adversaries, the issuers have reason to support 
and encourage this approach.
This technique has applications in anonymized voting procedures, but it can just as 
easily be applicable to any digital service where only a selected number of attributes is 
required to authenticate or authorize a user. Eligibility to vote can be verified based on 
nationality, residence or similar attributes by appropriate bodies without the need for them to 
know how the vote was cast. Similarly, the eligibility to pay reduced fare in public transport 
can be verified by tax offices without the public transportation knowing how much a citizen 
earns. Blinded signatures thus allow the service receiving such credentials to verify the user’s 
eligibility without knowing anything else about the individual.
Technique 3. Single-use credentials.
Credentials such as standard-issue ID numbers or credit cards – or even online login 
data, especially if a single account is used for many services -  that can be used many times 
are considered convenient for users because they do not require sophisticated devices and 
online interactions.  Unfortunately, this convenience comes at the expense of privacy as 
observers associate multiple transactions with the same identifier and use this information to 
construct a profile. Potential observers include not only service providers who are able to 
identify repeated visits from the same user, but also third parties such as platform operators 
and governmental agencies beyond the provider of the service.  We suggest that the linkage 
problem is the inevitable result of credential reuse, and the solution is to avoid credential 
reuse altogether by using single-use credentials: an individual presents a particular credential 
to a service provider exactly once and then never uses the same credential again.  Single-use 
credentials share important features with fungible tokens; features that allow tokens to be 
distinguishable from one other based on their transaction history might impact their value in 
use (Berg 2019).
 Physical, single use tickets are perhaps the simplest form of single-use credentials. 
Individuals purchasing tickets for public transportation do not generally need to reveal any 
information about themselves, and when they validate the ticket or present it to vehicle 
operators, no information is attached except that they are authorized to board the vehicle. The 
same principles should be obeyed if public transportation tickets, and any other credentials, 
are implemented in digital form.
Technique 4. User-generated identifiers and keys.
For citizens to manage the linkages between their data, they must be able to generate 
their own identifiers. When third parties such as the manufacturers of devices or identity cards 
choose identifiers or keys on behalf of their users, then users have no way to be sure that there 
is no link between the identifiers or keys and the users that can be exploited (Abelson et al. 
1997).  Such exploitation could be carried out either by the third parties themselves, by their 
business partners, or by others with the power either to monitor their activities, to coerce them 
to disclose information about specific linkages, or to introduce weaknesses into the 
mechanism that they use to generate identifiers or keys. Users should not accept identifiers or 
keys that might be linkable.  The solution is for users to generate identifiers and keys on their 
own devices, using well-audited, open-source technology.  Although this step requires a 
degree of capability on behalf of the user's devices as well as a significant public 
responsibility to conduct audits and maintenance activities, we suggest that these steps are 
essential.
 Technique 5. Distributed infrastructure.
Finally,  we argue that public services should be run on distributed rather than 
centralized infrastructure. Infrastructure operated by a global platform operator is problematic 
at a system level for several reasons, including lack of diversity, lack of incentive for 
evolution, the opportunity for rent seeking, and so on.  Also, the central  platform operator has 
a chance to observe the metadata about all of the transactions, even if the transactions 
themselves are encrypted.  For example, although the global operator of an encrypted chat 
platform might not be able to read the messages that its users send to each other, the global 
operator would still be able to see who talks to whom, when, how often, and for how long.  
Such metadata can still be used to precisely target individuals (Healy 2013).  Most 
importantly, the central operator could change the rules of the system without the need to 
publicly ask the system operators to change their systems to follow the new rules.  This 
friction, inefficient as it may be, is an essential check on the power of central authority, even 
when it has the legitimate power of oversight.
Practical considerations
Identification of design principles and candidate techniques that can fulfil the chosen 
constraints on data management is the first step to implement privacy-preserving and 
systemically robust digital public services. However, successful implementation requires that 
these principles are clear to all stakeholders and broadly adopted. To ensure their adoption 
and to well-target any changes we need to identify the group of stakeholders that is both in 
position to implement appropriate design principles as well as has interest in doing so. 
This group includes executive officials, often specialists, tasked with procuring, 
managing and overseeing the implementation of specific policies and public services, 
including their digital versions. 
These experts, who generally work on behalf of the executive branches of the 
government, are not driven by short election cycles, are bound by more direct relations of 
trust and accountability to the constituents, and can benefit from appropriate implementation 
of data management.  This group could benefit greatly from targeted knowledge bases and 
best practice reviews that promote a critical approach to data management – including 
outsourcing to commercial organizations – in the public sector. For this reason, executive 
officials are especially valuable to policy dialogue, wherein scientific concepts and analysis of 
the full consequences of digitizing the public sector can meet the practical constraints of 
policy making.
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